University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Other Publications

Faculty Scholarship

2001

The NLRA: A Call to Collective Bargaining
Theodore J. St. Antoine
University of Michigan Law School, tstanton@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other/38

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/other
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legislation Commons
Recommended Citation
St. Antoine, Theodore J. "The NLRA: A Call to Collective Bargaining." Law Quad. Notes 44, no. 3 (2001): 95-9. (Taken from "The
Once and Future Labor Act: Myths and Realities" delivered at the Third Annual Lecture to the College of Labor and Employment
Lawyers in Washington, D. C. in May 2001.)

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Other Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For
more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

The following essay is taken from "The Once
and Future Labor Act: Myths and Realities,"
delivered last May in Washington, D.C., as
the third annual lecture to the College of
Labor and Employment Lawyers. Previous
lectures in the series were delivered by Abner
J. Mikva, former White House counsel and
retired chief judge of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
and Judge Richard A. Posner, chief judge of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Chicago.

A century ago the legal specialty of
most members of this audience would
have been known as Master and
Servant Law. By the time my
generation entered law school, the
Decennial Dgest had just added a new
topic - Labor Relations Law.That of
course dealt with collective bargaining
and union-management relations
generally Now, a half century further
along, we might seem to have come
full circle, to judge by the lectures of
the two eminent jurists who
inaugurated this series. Both Abner
Mikva and hchard Posner spoke on
highly important and timely subjects,
and yet those would be classified, not
as Labor Law, but as Employment Law
-to use today's term - or even as
Master and Servant Law - the term
still employed by the Decennial Digest.
So today, at the risk of being a bit out
of fashion, I am going to return to the
past, and I hope the future as well,
and talk about the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).
The Congress that passed the
Wagner Act in 1935 was very different
from the post-World War I1 Congress
that passed the Taft-Hartley Act 12
years later. Nonetheless, I am satisfied
from my interviews and from my
reading of the legslative history that
the Supreme Court's statement in the
First National Maintenance case (1981)
could apply to either statute:
"Congress had no expectation that the
elected union representative would
become an equal partner in the
running of the business enterprise in
whlch the union's members are
employed."
What, then, did Senator Wagner
and the 1935 Congress have in mind?
I believe language in the Findings and
Policies of the orignal NLRA, which
was retained in the Taft-Hartley
amendments despite some vocal
opposition, got it right. The "policy of
Continued on page 96
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rhe United States" was declared to be
encouraging the practice and procedure of
collective bargainingyy
and "protecting the
exercise by workers of full freedom of
,lssociation,self-organization, and
designation of representatives of their own
choosing. . . ." If that was the aim,
however, somethng seems to have gone
~erriblywrong during the past half century.
In the mid-1950s over 38 percent of
private nonagricultural employees were
unionized. Today that figure has slipped to
less that 10 percent - about one-quarter
of the percentage at the 1950s' peak, and a
little less than what it was on the eve of the

The decline of organized labor
The explanation for union decline is
rely multifactored: the shift of jobs from
the manufacturing to the service industries,
and from the unionized to the nonunionized
sections of the country; tighter legal
restraints imposed by the Taft-Hartley and
Landrum-Griffin amendments to the
N W ;an aging, complacent, and
unaggressive union leadership; and
perhaps a growing feeling among
employees that unionization is no longer
necessary in a time of economic prosperity
and enlightened management. Insofar as
workers may have knowingly and
voluntarily chosen to refrain from
organizing, of course, the National Labor
Relations Act is fulfilling its objective of
ensuring "full freedom of associationnjust
as if they had eagerly signed a union
authorization card. But there are facts that
give one pause about accepting such a
~ e n a r i oas the whole story.
At the same time that union membership
went into a nosedive in the private sector,
it was soaring in the public sector. The
percentage of government employees
represented by unions now stands at
+2 percent -over four times the
percentage in private employment.
Included are many groups that would
formerly have been classhxl as
'unorganizable": school teachers, doctors,

legislature and a governor have authorized
unionization, it will be the rare agency
head who will strongly object. That does
make one ' onder about the extent to
which emp oyer opposition, and subtle or
not-so-subtle intimidation, may have ,,
operated in the private sector.
Extrapolating from figures supplied by
Professor Paul Weiler, for example, I once
calculated that employer discrimination
against employees during union organizing
drives increased about four to six times
between the 1950s and the 1980s.
The situation is entirely different in
Western Europe, which historically has
been twice as organized, proportionately, as
the United States, and is now even more
so. There is a biting- irony- in this. Ours is
probably the most conservative, least
ideological of all labor movements,
traditionally committed to the capitalistic
system and to the principle that
management should have the primary
responsibility for managing. Yet American
business in the main has never been
accepting of unionization and collective
bargaining. In part this resistance may
result from the highly decentralized
character of American industrial relations.
An employer usually must confront a
union on a one-to-one basis, without thq
security blanket of association bargaining
on behalf of all or substantially all the firms
in a particular industry as is customary in
Western Europe. In part the resistance to
union organization may spring, among
both employers and employees, from
ingrained American attitudes of rugged
individualism and the ideal of the classless
society As a corollary, many employers
resent, as an automatic reflex, any intrusion
on their total autonomy and flexibility in
running the enterprise.
In the somewhat atypical cofitext of an
academic institution, 1 myself have been
the equivalent of a CEO. I have even
delivered a captive audience speech of
sorts, with one of my better labor law
students sitting in the audience and talung
notes to document any unfair labor
practices 1 might commit. Our clerical staff
was organized at one point but later the
union was decertified. I saw no adverse
impact on our operations under the
unionized regime. My secretarial director
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unionization had its advantages. she cad1
'
deal &th just one person to settle a
complaint, instead of having to cope wi a
number of individuals with often-diver 'ng
views. John Dunlop may have phrased it
more elegantly, but essentially he made the
same point when he said: "A great deal of
the complexity and beauty of collective I
bargaining involvq the process of
compromise and assessment of prioritip
within each side."
Certainly, employer aversion to
unionism can hardIy be justified by a
dispassionate analysis of the actual impact
of collective bargaining in this $ounuy. The
consensus of labor economists is that
,unionization cannot be proven to have
produced any substantial shift of coborate
income fr& capital to labor. Union workers have obtained a wage level that lis ;
10 to 20 percent-higher than their
nonunion c~nterparts.But that differential
is largely offset by increased efficiency and
greater productivity in unionized firms.
Indeed, the major contribution of collective
bargaining is probably not economic at all.
It is the joint creation of the grievance and
arbitration system. The mere existence of
such procedures helps to eradicate such
former abuses as favoritism, arbitrary or illinformed decisionmaking, and outright
discrimination in the workplace.
,
From my own experience and from my
research and discussions with-union and
management representatives, I would
further conclude that collective bargaining
has promoted both labor peace and
broader worker participation in improving
the quality of products and services offered
the public. Unilaterally or in conjunction
with unions, employers have sought .
employee input through plans variously
denominated participative management,
quality of work life (QWL) programs, and
employee involvement. That is smart
business. The worker on the assembly line
will spot flaws that have escaped the eye of
the keenest industrial engineer. I suspect
some participative programs have been
adopted as union-avoidance devices. Yet
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d b b y Pmfmsor 'I'homas
T and others h d that a
'

amrig W o n presence
be essential ta
tgmtak >thelong-tmn surviml and
mpttnuing success of QWL undertakings.

! Fln dsly to bargain
Inreeonmending ways to revise or
minte-qmt the NLRA to better achieve itsunderlying purposes, I would start with
what I iregard as the Actb constructive
centerpiece, the duty-to bargain colIectively
To realize the full potential of creative
negotiating, we should shed as much as
p d b l e of the straitjacket imposed by the
famoys Borg-Wmr case (1958). There the
Supreme Court accepted a rigid and
unrealistic dichotomy between mandatory
dpermissive subjects of bargaining. The
parties are only required to bargain about
mandatory subjects (the statutorily
prescribed "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment"), and on$
they m y be the basis for an impasse or
deadlock in negotiations. I began my legal
m e r worlung with an able, tough-minded
management attorney who argued
hrg-Warner Except for a client veto, he
would have urged that all lawful subjects
be' mandatory. He believed that government
fiat should not control so basic and
individualized a question as the contract
hes a particular employer or union
important enough to back up with a
lackour. or a strike.
Hypocrisy is encouraged and candor
reduced by the Borg-Warner formula.
A mwy party that urgently desires a
pmissive subject in a contract can usually
bring negotiations to an artificial deadlock
over a legally sanctioned mandatory topic.
kcperieneed, sophisticated participants in a
~ t u r edurable
,
bargaining relationship do
QQI engage in such ploys to evade the lawk
stmined distinceions. If a. union like the
United Auto Workers wishes to &cuss
m i o n improvements for retired workers,
k&umally a nonmandatory subject, the
B ~ Three
B
auto manufacturers discuss
tkm. Other veteran management lawyers
QU me.similar stories. In those cimamsrnces
thc law is superfluous. Where legal
~ k t i o isa needed is for inexperienced or
hobcle parties and immature, M l e '

rehticmhip. The re ~ q @ e dfar
bargaining s h d zkdt7Zrea setfours
i.mgmbmto IlEmams cpc-id
need for swift action. A sampling I once
madeofNLRBcase&~tedthat
mgotiarlims mduxl an impasse or
deadlock in, a median period of six and
one-half weeks. After impasse, of course,
an empI'qe may M r n t e its proposed
terms u n i l a t e d ~without the c o m t of
the union. Barg-WaWs mandatory-permissive
ruMc probably reflects a national
consensus that there is some untouchble
core of entrepreneurial and union
autonomy h t is beyond the reach of
compulsory collective bargaining. An
outright ovemling of Box-Warner,
either
judicially or legislatively is therefore
unlikely even in a much more liberal
political climate than exists today But at
least I think it would make for Ear healthier
and more responsible labor relations if the
duty to bargain encompassed, as the Labor
Board once declared, any employer action
that could effect a "signdicmt impairment
of job tenure, employment security or
reasonably anticipated work opportunities
for those in the bargaining unit." That
conclusion is adequately supported by the
language, legislative histoq and policy of
the NLRA. The S u p m e Court gave
qualified endorsementto the pmposition in
Fibreboard Paptr Products (1966).Despite
the Courtk subsequent retreat in Erst
National Maintenance (1981), sound
personnel policies alone would argue that
the broader scope of required bargaining
should ultimately prevail.
Collective baqpining is much more than
a means of allocating employee jobs and
compensation. Even a hard-headed labor
economist like Neil Chamberlain was
moved to say: "IT]
he workers" struggle for
increasing participation in business
decisions . . . is highly dunged with an
ethical content." For me, this moral
dimension of negotiations between unions
and management cannot be avoided,
because those negotiations determine the
nature of work in the shop. And it is
px+marilywork that defines a man or a
woman - that largely determines a
person's very identity A thoughtful study
for the k d d government has found that
"most, if not all, working people tend to
-
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,hwiEret k e v I v a in tenne of the worL
p u p or m*tim
to which they
belong. The question Who are you?' oken
elicits an m g m k a t i o related
~
response.
. . . Occupational role is usually a pm of
the response far all clastios: 'I'm a
steelworker,' or 'I'm a lawyer.'"

Frustration over the inmasing emfloyer
resistance to unionization and the f d m of
o q p i z b g efforts in recent years has led to
propods for some major changes in the
law These have induded the certification
of unim on the baas of card checks,
"instant elections," and cornpuky
arbvation of first contracts as a remedy for
employer refusals to barn. W e E
understand and sympathve with the
motivation behna these recamrnen&tioms,
I am generally not happy with them.
The installation of a: labor organization
as the exclusive bargaining representative
of the employees under Section %a) of the
NLM is more than the undated choice of
an a p t by a principal. It could be
k r i b e d as a statutody rnandated shotpn
maTziage, esrabkhmg an ongoing ma
lh t 4 1 substantially alter the way an
employer must mrry on its day-to-dq
business. The union's decisions will dm be
binding on dissenting employees,,e m
though they may constitute d e ta a
rnajoriy in the bargaining unit. Under
those cixumstancesit seems only fair that
the employer should have the opportunity
to get his side of the story across to the
employees before they vote. Denying the
employer that right might even raise
constitutional fm speech issues. For those
reasons I would oppose instant elections or
automatic ceaification simply on the basis
of a card check. Compulsory arbitration af
first contracts, if limited to cases of
employers' flagrant refusals to bargain, is
more supportable. But it still cuts against as
basic a policy as we have in our labor law,
namely, freedom of contract. As expressed
by the Supreme Court in American M o d
Insurance (1952),it is not the Function of
government to "sit in judgment upon tke
substantive terms of collective bargaining
Continued on pgt 98
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Getman recommendation that was at least
partially
accepted by the Reagaq-Bush
agreements." The effect has been to
Labor Board, al&ough ulrimatel~rejected
preclude the NLRB from imposing a
by the Supreme Court in Lrchnun (1992).
contract term even as the remedy for a
Under certain circumstances a union
rehsal to bargain by an employer.
should have access to an employe& premises
Considerable controversy has been
to counter management campaigning pqior
generated over the nature and effectsof
to an election,
in lasger
conduct during a ufiono r g u n g
where employees disperse
campaign. A quarter century ago, a
widely at the end of the workday. The
ProfeSS~YS
plant or shop is the natural forumfor
Steve Goldberg and Jack German found
conveyingviews about unionization.
s u ~ ~ o s ecoercive
d l ~ tactiCS A pany denied access is under a severe
did not "sigruficantly" affect employees'
handicap in trying to reach the voters.
Mq
behavior. nq therefore
That is truer in todayk fragmented,
that the NLRB "cease regulating speech
heterogeneous society than it ever was.
and, for election purposes, nearly all
Although I am no fan of "instant
Separate sets
elections," the blunt reality is that prolonged
Derek Bok and myself with union
campaigns are an open invitation to
organizers indicated that they did not
unscrupulous employers (or unions) to
believe most employer speeches were all
engage in coerdve activity. Maybe a
that intimidaring. They
statutory time limit should be imposed on
that the pmence of management 'peakers
the processing of the routine representation
and the absence of union
at
'
case. Her- a fairbalarrcewould & to be
workplace forums conveyed a strong
struck between the employer's need,
message about the
power of the
especially the smaller or inexperienced
competing parties. In later years, the
employer's need, to prepare and get its
Goldberg-Geunan
has been vigOrOusl~ message across to the workforce, and the
contested by most other observers-At One
goal of preventing the tactics of "stall, delay,
time I was quite taken by the Goldbergand intimidate." The ill-fated Labor Reform
Getman views, especially because they
Bill of 1978, as passed by the House,
paralleled my Own investigations. But my
would have allowed a maximum of 25 ,
inquiries were made in the early ,605, and
hysbetween the fi% of the election
that was a different
have
been
petition and the holding of the elenion.
shaken the satistics On the increasing
That seems too short. An employer needs
by private
number of statutory
at least a couple of weeks to prepare for a
employers and by the
board hearing. The 1978 House-passed
patterns of union organizing in the public
measure might hm left only a week
and private sectors.
between the regional directork direction of
I stdl see little sense in the board's
an election and the election itself. Without
&thering over mch employer comments
attempting to be too precise from my
lega1
as, "1 will fight the union in
academic, non-practicing perch, I would
possible- - - - I'll deal hard with it, I'll
suggest a maximum time in the o r b r y
cold with it. I'll deal at am's length with
case about twice t h t pre&d
by the
, it." So 1 believe the board should get Out of
1978 bill between the petition a$d the
time-~011suming,hair-splitting process
Iofthescrutinizing
the combatants'.presentations election -let's say around or seven
weeksm
for evidence of mislleabg or vaguely
The NLRA has never provided for
Iominous statements. But all parties are
general damages for injuries inflicted on
entitled to an election free of outright
employees. The remedies for unfair labor
s
and the practices traditionally are ceaseand-desist
discrimination or e ~ e @ o uthreats,
board must continue to set aside elections
orders and reinstatement withor
rife with serious misconduct or blatantly
back pay yet if an employer unlawfufly
coercive speech by either employers or
refuses to bargain with a majority union,
unions. I would also adopt one Goldbergthe employees are deprived of the benefits
negotiations might have produced, usually

I
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including a wage in+ase. The cmvrrnriml
remedy,of an order to bargain operates .
only p~dspectivelyand does,nobng to
restore the months or years otfinwcial l q s
the employees may have suffered. At l m i
when the emplaye~Sviolation is flagrant
and egregious, the NLRB should be able to
provide monetary relief. Remediq are the
lifeblood of rights, and the status quo sudcs ;
much of the blood out of the fundamental
right to organize and bargain co~ectivel~,
At one point the D.C. Circuit seemed on
the verge of recognizing the validity of a
compensatory remedy for flagrant
violations, but then it grew fainthearted
and drew back.
, i
Neither principle nor practical
calculation problems should stand in the
way of an appropriate monetary a w d in
these cases. A make-whole remedy would
not be a contract imposed on the parties by
the board; it wouMhave no continuing
existence intqihe future. It would be a
form of back pay order- based on the
putative contract that could have resulted
from good-faith bargaining, discounted by
the chances that the parties would not have
reached agreement. The measure of the loss
~ o u l be
d derived from a composite of
union contracts in s d r labor-management
relationships. Qf course there is an element
of speculation here, but no more so than in
many contrqct, tort, or antitrust damage
awards. In other contexts we do not
hesitate to resolve such doub~againstthe
wrongdoer. This make-whole relief would
also be genuinely remedial and not punitive.
It would simply put in the employees'
pockets what the employer denied than by
its bad faith in refusing to bargain. I harbor
no illusions that my proposal is likely to be
embraced any time soon by the current
federal judiciary or by Congress. But it is
one of the most prized of academic
prerogatives that one can cavalierly dismiss
the unseeing present, and address oneself
to the far more receptive and sagacious
future.
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tunion employee participation
I

laving espoused traditional union

1 organization up to this point, 1 think it

only fair to say a few words about another
and quite different development in this
countly. A growng number of companies,
both large and small, especially in the new
high-tech industries and in the old
personal-sen.ice industries, are nonunion. I
have my suspicions about whether all their
employees have knowingly and voluntarily
rejected the opportunity to organize. But I
have no doubt that many of these workers,
wisely or othenvlse, have freely chosen to
rcmain without union representation. Still,
their employers, if they have gone to the
right business schools, will wish to solicit
the workers' opinions and suggestions in a
systematic way. And you can count on it
that some employer or employee will
eventually come up with the idea of a
formal "employee committee" to facilitate
the process. The company will be pleased
to provide an office and a typewriter, coffee
and doughnuts at joint meetings with
management, and even a note taker at the
meetings to see that the employees' views
and proposals are properly recorded and
transmitted to the company's higher-ups.
However congenial to the parties, most
of these arrangements are, under the strict
loge of NLRB precedent, violations of
Section 8(a)(2) of the Labor Act. They
constitute illegal employer "domination" or
"assistance" of what is technically regarded
as a "labor organization." Fortunately, in
my opinion, some federal courts of appeals
have realized that Section 8(a)(2) was
aimed at quite different targets. Those were
the puppet-like sham "company unions" of
the 1930s and the employers who gave
preferential treatment to their favorite (the
less assertive and more malleable) as
between competing unions. If 2 1st century
employees have chosen freely and
knowingly and the committee or other
body acts truly on their behalf and for their
benefit, I see no reason for objection except
the dead hand of a long-distant past. While
1 might believe the workers' interests
would be better served by a full-fledged
union and collective bargaining, that is not
my decision to make. Paternalistic
safeguards may have been necessary to

protcct an uninformed and vulnerable
workforce against itself in the Depression
Era, hut that would hardly seem the reality
today. Section 8(a)(2) should be liberally
construed or else amended to permit
nonunion employee participation in
management decisionmaking as long as it
is wholly voluntary.

Conclusion
One of the truly great people of our
time is Monsignor George G. Hiwns, the
famous "labor priest." For 25 years he was
the director of the Social Action Department of the United States Catholic
Conference. and for almost a half centun
he chaired that unique es~erimentin
union democracy the UAWs Public Re\iew
Board. His achievements have not gone
unrecognized. This past year he added to
his man). awards the Presidential Medal of
Freedom, the highest honor this country
can bestow upon a civilian. J7et despite his
eminence, it is entirely characteristic of the
man that he has devoted himself in recent
years to the betterment of a@cultural
workers, those American "untouchables"
who do not enjoy the protections afforded
by the NLRA.
Monsicqor Higins is both a social
activist and a social thinker, steeped in the
teachings of the Papal encyclicals on the
condition of labor. Dravlng upon those
social encyclicals, he has even been
prepared to suggest that working people
may often have a "certain moral obligation
to join a union." An intellectual tradition
even older than MonsiLqorS, harking back
to Aristotle and the Greek philosophers,
holds that human beings are social and
political creatures, "whose nature is to 1n.e
with others." We are nearly all joiners. It is
not enough to have an ABA Section of
Labor and Employment La\\: which accepts
all comers. MTe must have a more selective
group, the College of Labor and
Employment Lawyers. We want to be with
and work with our peers. Is it any wonder,
then. that MonsiLgnorHigins \vould enjoin
most working people to come together in
organizations capable of advancing their
common g,oals7
That, then. is for me the glory of the
Wagner Act. It was not designed to make
employees :he equal partners of employers,

II

nor j7etto p ~ the
t L \ \ , Cgroups
~
aqalnst e c x h
other in eternal combat. Rather, ~t
recognized the reality that at tlmes the~r
differing concerns urould lead to conflict,
but c~\dlzedconfl~ctwthln appropnate
rules of engagement, and that at other
tlmes their mutual interests ~vouIdlead to
periods of estended cooperation. Only a
suicidal worker or deranged labor leader
seeks ill for the company that holds the
key to their economic wellbeing. In my
experience, management almost invariabl>y
knows more about running the enterprise
than do the employees. But seldom if elver
does it know so much that it cannot learn
from them. Similarly, employees almost
invariably know more about what is good
for themselves than does the most
benevolent and well-intentioned of employers.
The situation begs for the interchange of
ideas and mutual accommodation in a
systematic fashion. I cannot believe that a
private-sector workforce that is only onetenth organized is ultimately good for
labor, for management, or for the \\.hole of
our society And so I look for a day when
the promise of the LVaLgnerAct - that
workers may freely organize and bargain
collectively through representatives of their
own choosing - is at long last fuIfilled.
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